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Social  protection  aims  to  provide  a  national  platform  for  smoothly  transitioning  from  a  chaotic 
collection of shock responses to an institutionalized system for risk and non-risk management. For the 
poorest, the transition aims to move away from ad hoc, unpredictable relief to national safety nets that 
deliver  timely,  multi-year,  guaranteed  and  predictable  transfers.  Social  protection  has  to  face 
particular challenges in chronically poor, shock-prone countries where the distinction between the 
chronic and transitory poor is often blurred. Other conceptual and programmatic issues also need 
further investigation. For filling these gaps, a research agenda articulated in ten thematic areas is 
proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
“Social protection is moving up in the development agenda.” So begins a recent World Bank 
paper on the role of social protection in a globalizing world
i. Indeed, in recent years social 
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protection  has  triggered  new  exciting  academic  initiatives,  and  original  research  has 
increasingly  been  undertaken  or  commissioned  by  governments,  universities,  specialized 
research institutes, and NGOs. Several different (although linked) areas of research have fed 
into  the  social  protection  debate,  including  pro-poor  growth  theories;  the  economics  of 
information; the famine and entitlement theories; literature on markets and public action; 
humanitarian  relief;  economic  analysis  of  cash  and  in-kind  approaches;  and  livelihood 
analysis.  
Drawing from this rich and diverse panorama of research, social protection aims providing 
a national agenda for smoothly shift from a chaotic collection of social programmes to an 
institutionalized system able to (i) tackling vulnerability upfront by anticipating predictable 
shocks,  and  (ii)  making  emergency  responses  more  development-oriented.  Additional 
approaches  also  conceive  social  protection  as  an  opportunity  for  implementing  socially 
transformative policies. 
That said, three notes of caution are needed. Firstly, available analytical definitions are not 
unanimous in defining what social protection should achieve and what set of policies and 
programmes  it  should  include.  This  is  reflected  in  different  analytical  frameworks, 
unresolved caveats and possible implicit biases. Questions also arise on whether there is an-
ongoing tendency of repackaging old-fashion interventions with new trendy labels. Secondly, 
the general tendency of moving away from a narrow focus on social safety nets to a more 
holistic approach to social protection doesn’t entail that safety nets should be overlooked. 
They still play a fundamental role, especially for the poorest groups. Following Haddad and 
Frankenberger (2003, p.2), “…safety net transfers are not just residual to the growth process - 
they should be an integral part of a growth strategy”. Thirdly, there seems to be a tendency of 
considering risk as the only causal driver in explaining vulnerability and poverty dynamics. 
While risk plays an important role in shaping our understanding of poverty, it is important to 
recognize the limits of a mere risk-based analysis, especially in chronically poor areas.  
Hence, there are not only challenges in narrowing actors’ perceptions on the theme, but 
also in articulating a comprehensive framework that places social protection as an organizing 
framework – a platform able to gather actors and build synergies between approaches in 
order  to  better  plan  national  development.  While  arguing  that  social  protection  has  such 
potentiality,  this  article  alerts  that  social  protection  has  to  face  institutional,  policy  and 
operational challenges. For example, while mounting research has been undertaken on single 
social protection components, less attention has been paid on exploring possible synergies 
between such components, thus making the system more cohesive. This article takes stock of 
thinking about social protection, identifies future challenges, and lays out research priorities 
for throwing light on ten thematic areas that need further investigation.  
The next paragraph critically reviews recent thinking on vulnerability. Paragraph three 
then explores what is new in the social protection agenda and how it is placed in addressing 
vulnerability. Paragraph four looks at ways for better integrating safety nets into broader 
social protection strategies, while paragraph five concludes.  
 
 
2. Vulnerability, Risk and Non-Risk Factors 
In recent years, the concept of vulnerability has stimulated new analytical refinements and 
original empirical research which have greatly contributed to a better understanding of the 
processes  that  lead  to  poverty
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political and social conditions (see figure 1), a process of cumulative conditions which vary 
over time and space depending largely on the changing processes through which individuals, 
households and communities fulfil their immediate subsistence needs and invest in medium 
and long reproduction of their social system (WFP, 2002; Alwang et al., 2001; Siegel and 
Alwang, 1999).  
 
While complexity underlies such a definition, ‘living on the edge’ provides a graphic 
image of the livelihood circumstances that the vulnerability definition conveys. Living on the 
edge evokes the sense of a small push sending a person or people over the edge, and it is just 
this knife edge between ability to survive and thrive, and sudden loss of ability to do so, that 
vulnerability seeks to describe (Ellis, 2003). However, assessing vulnerability is like “trying 
to measure something that is not there, making the search for a visible reference point a 
difficult task” (Webb and Harinarayan, 1999, p.298). In fact, while there are concepts that 
have a standard to refer to (e.g anthropometrics measures), vulnerability can be addressed 
only  by  adopting  a  relative  approach  without  referring  to  a  defined  benchmark  or  ‘gold 
standard’ (Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003; Ligon and Schechter, 2002; Maxwell et al., 
1999). 
Vulnerability needs to be defined in relation to specific threats, and the concept per se can 
be analyzed through a wide set of related but not identical lens (e.g. vulnerability to income 
poverty, malnutrition, or natural disasters), which may affect different people in different 
ways,  times  and  magnitudes.  Single  measures  of  deprivation  are  ex-post  and  atemporal, 
usually treated in static, non-probabilistic terms (Barrett and McPeak, 2003). They capture 
the  basic  information  on  present  conditions,  while  vulnerability  seeks  to  capture  the 
underlying causal processes that led to the actual status, and which are likely to influence 
future conditions (Lautze et al., 2003). According to Frankenberger (2003, p.21), “poverty 
and  food  insecurity  are  essentially  static  concepts  whereas  vulnerability  is  dynamic  and 
describes how people move in and out of poverty and food insecurity. [They] often are a 
snap-shot in a point in time that will not be able to capture dynamics of the vulnerability 
dimension”.  
Much  research  has  been  carried  out  on  vulnerability,  especially  with  an 
economic/entitlements lens aspects. This body of research documents that vulnerability can e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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be lessened through effective risk management strategies
iii aimed at (1) reducing the exposure 
to risks, (2) increasing in the ability to manage risks, or (3) both (Haddad and Frankenberger, 
2003). While (1) enshrines the likelihood that individuals or households will be affected by a 
shock (i.e. the realized risk), (2) captures individual’s or household’s ability to manage such 
threats  -  either  before  or  after  they  occurred  (Heitzmann  et  al.,  2002;  Holzmann  and 
Jorgensen, 2000). Risks and shocks are not the same phenomena because not all the risks 
materialize and hit people. However, when they do (and for whom they do) they become a 
shock which can be analyzed from many different points of view
iv (Morduch and Sharma, 
2002; Tesliuc and Lindert, 2002; Davies, 1996). Some risks cannot be actually eliminated 
(e.g. most of the natural ones), while other risks can be de facto eradicated (e.g. malaria). 
Then – and in particular in the case of natural disasters – the burden of risk management 
often relies on the active provision of effective instruments to “to find a way to live with 
these phenomena” (ISDR, 2002, p.5). This means that “even when a prime mover in famine 
is a natural occurrence such as floods or droughts, what its impact will be on the population 
would depend on how society is organized” (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p.46). In other words, 
“enhancing  resiliency  does  not  mean  reducing  the  number  of  shocks.  […]  Reducing 
vulnerability rests on helping communities better manage the many risks that they face on a 
daily  basis”  (Webb  and  Rogers,  2003,  p.8).  Also  Devereux  and  Sabates-Wheeler  (2004) 
argued that “…if rather than focusing on risk as an exogenously given factor to be managed, 
vulnerability is conceptualised as emerging from and embedded in the socio-political context, 
then our attention would no longer be focused on how to design a policy so that various 
groups face less risk in a given context, but on how to change this context to minimise risk 
for a range of vulnerable groups” (p.6). 
On  the  risk  management  side,  three  broad  classes  are  usually  identified,  namely 
‘prevention’, ‘mitigation’ and ‘coping’ strategies (Heitzmann et al., 2002; Holzmann and 
Jorgensen,  2000,  1999;  Alderman  and  Paxson,  1992).  While  prevention  and  mitigation 
strategies are both ex-ante (i.e. undertaken before the risk materializes), the prevention ones 
reduce the probability of the shock from occurring, whereas mitigation strategies are aimed at 
reducing the potential impact of the shock when it occurs, for example through portfolio 
diversification or insurance mechanisms. Such ex ante risk management strategies may come 
at high cost. For example, Walker and Ryan (1990) found that households in semi-arid areas 
of India may sacrifice up to 25% of their average incomes to reduce exposures to shocks. 
Therefore, effective public action that reduces such costs and makes ex ante options more 
accessible is highly recommended. 
On the other hand, coping strategies – undertaken to relieve the impact of shocks once 
they occurred – may even be more costly than the ex ante ones. These ex-post strategies, now 
widely  documented,  usually  concern  the  depletion,  erosion  and  dis-saving  of  financial, 
physical, human and natural capital. Poor households may be unable to fully cope or recover 
from a shock, becoming even more vulnerable to the next shock. Their asset holdings may be 
minimal (in the extreme case they may have not accumulated assets for their entire lifetime) 
and thus  may  be  are  rendered  destitute  by  the  smallest income  loss,  running the risk  of 
irreversible  damages  to  their  wealth  base.  Following  Maxwell  and  Frankenberger  (1993, 
p.29), “coping may be a misleading positive word, implying that food insecure households 
survive  period  of  high  risk  unscathed:  in  fact,  households  may  survive  only  at  cost  of 
significant impoverishment”.  e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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Many  related  concepts  belonging  to  various  economic  branches  (such  as  risk  attitudes, 
decisions  under  uncertainty,  portfolio  management,  income  and  consumption  smoothing) 
have been applied, and important insights have been provided for understanding poverty 
dynamics under subsistence constraints
v (Zimmermann and Carter, 2003). Indeed, a growing 
body  of  literature  is  now showing  that the  poor is not  an  homogeneous  group,  and that 
vulnerability is a key-factor in scrutinizing, for example, the distinction between chronic and 
transitory poverty
vi. Part of the literature shows that, on the one hand, the transitory poor are 
usually considered highly dynamic (move in and out a fixed benchmark) – they are the so 
called ‘vulnerable’ (to a worsening condition). At this point one would expect the chronic 
poor to be ‘highly vulnerable’, but apparently this is not echoed in many studies (Holzmann 
and Jorgensen, 2000). Indeed, the chronically poor are implicitly considered more static, even 
if they still have a transitory component (Jalan and Ravallion, 2000). From this perspective, 
they are considered trapped into their day-by-day constraints, static and hence less vulnerable. 
In reality, they are often moving ‘up and down’ well below a defined threshold, and what 
makes them even more vulnerable to starvation than the transitory poor is not only the tiny 
distance from a survival line, but also the downward trajectory that they often show. With the 
terminology of Hulme and Shepherd (2003), this may be the part of the ‘always poor’ with a 






This  trend  represents  a  slow-but-inexorable  erosion  of  assets  over  time,  causing  the 
collapse of the resilience capacity of entire communities, which for example was the case of 
Malawi
vii (CARE,  2003b). However,  while  the  extent  to  which  the  always  poor  are  also 
descendent  remains  an  empirical  question,  the  more  attention  should  be  paid  on  the 
vulnerability of chronic poor households. 
While  there  are  different  frameworks  for  conceptualizing  vulnerability  and  risk 
management  –  which  often  trigger  different  approaches  to  social  protection  –  important 
common themes are emerging (CARE, 2003a; Young et al. 2002; World Bank, 2001a). For 
example, considerable analytical and empirical attention has been deserved on ways to lift 
household far enough above a survival line to enable them to engage in riskier but higher-
return  activities,  in  particular  for  livelihoods  diversification
viii  –  a  niche  particularly e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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developed under  the  sustainable livelihoods  framework  (Cannon et  al.,  2003).  Following 
Webb and Rogers (2003, p.16) “…recent work on diversification serves as a useful bridge 
between work on agricultural intensification and poverty alleviation, on the one hand, and 
risks, shocks, and vulnerability, on the other”. A particularly exciting field of research is 
investigating ways to reduce barriers to entry and better include the poorest into such niches 
(Webb  et  al.,  2002;  Dercon,  2001;  Hashemi,  2001;  RESAL,  2000).  A  recent  body  of 
literature  is  arguing  that  while  risk  plays  a  very  important  role  in  explaining  poverty 
dynamics, it may not the only factor to be considered. So if vulnerability is merely analyzed 
in terms of risks, the understanding which emerges will at best be partial (CPRC, 2004; 
Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003). Risk analysis can’t often take into due account the structural 
factors and processes that underlie poverty in general, and chronic poverty in particular; these 
factors include the discrimination and stigma affecting particular social or linguistic groups, 
categories  of  people  (such  as  poor  disabled,  older,  orphans  or  widows),  and  the  poor’s 
exclusion from economic and political participation through isolation and voicelessness (Bird 
and Pratt, 2004; Bird et al. 2002). In other words, vulnerability should be complemented with 
other analytical approaches that provide additional insights to risks (Barrientos et al., 2005). 
Following Barrientos and Shepherd’s discussion on the lives of the chronic poor (2003, p.7), 
“…  it  is  likely  to  be  grinding,  relentless  poverty  and  deprivation  and  the  day  to  day 
relationships and experiences that structure their lives which shapes their behaviors just as 
much  as,  if  not  more  than  calculations  of  risk
ix”.  Therefore,  a  more  comprehensive 
understanding  of  vulnerability  needs  to  balance  risk  factors  and  consequences  (i.e.  risk 
exposure, risk realization, inability to manage risks, shock impact and behavioural change) 
and non-risk factors. This more holistic interpretation can also be expressed as follows: 
 
Vulnerability = f [RF(r,s,m); NRF] 
 
This simple model considers vulnerability as a function of – on the one hand – risk factors 
(RF) which include risks (r), shocks (s), and the ability to manage R and S (m); on the other 
hand, the model also sets out the importance of considering social, religious and political 
factors that fall under the so called non-risk factors (NRF). The next paragraph investigates 
how social protection strategies are placed in responding to the challenges raised by this 
broader interpretation of vulnerability. 
 
3. Old and New Directions in Social Protection.  
Policy makers, academics and practitioners often equate social protection with terms such as 
welfare, social security, safety nets or social insurance mechanisms. While these terms might 
be part of the social protection equation, individually they are not equal to social protection 
per  se
x.  Following  Devereux  and  Sabates-Wheeler  (2004)  and  consistently  with  a  broad 
conceptualization of vulnerability, social protection is here defined as “all public and private 
initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable 
against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the 
overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised groups” (p.9). 
Social protection is now conceptualized as an overarching framework that goes beyond 
mere  transfers  and  toward  comprehensive  policies
xi (Shepherd,  2004;  GTZ,  2004;  WFP, 
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protection  systems  have  been  often  perceived  as  costly  policies  that  merely  perpetuate 
dependency among beneficiaries, and public action was increasingly called to limiting the 
scope for interventions to “what is feasible” rather than “what is desirable” (Alderman and 
Haque, 2005; Barrientos, 2005; Ravallion, 2003; Smith and Subbarao, 2003; Haddad and 
Zeller,  1996).  The  social  protection  panorama  was  characterized  by  a  ‘projectization’  of 
social  protection,  and  safety  nets  alone  have  often  been  expected  to  reduce  chronic 
vulnerability in a context where households’ coping capacity was already overwhelmed
xii 
(Devereux, 2003). Lessons learned on the ground and new empirical evidence suggest that 
the enhancement of resiliency among vulnerable households require a more comprehensive 
approach  to  social  protection
xiii.  While  examples  of  the  projectization  approach  are  still 
present (and probably are the norm in many countries), today social protection provides an 
agenda for making a smooth transition from the chaotic collection of humanitarian projects to 
a more institutionalized system that protects against risk and non-risk factors, and moves the 
centre of its activity to the government (Devereux, 2003; TISA, 2002).  
Conway  and  Norton  (2002)  argued  that  ‘what  is  new’  about  the  concept  of  social 
protection  is  the  link  it  makes  between  social  assistance  and  wider  objectives  such  as 
vulnerability, growth and rights. Following Barrientos and Shepherd (2003, p.3), today “the 
challenge  is  whether  and  to  what  extent  or  in  what  way  a  narrow  approach  to  social 
protection  developed  in  the  1990s and designed  predominantly  to  prevent  the  poor  from 
becoming destitute can also play a role in creating conditions for persistently poor people to 
emerge from poverty, and can even interrupt some of the structural patterns which maintain 
people in poverty”.  
The  new  discourse  of  social  protection  recognises  that  in  the  absence  of  effective 
collective arrangements to manage risks, individuals and households are forced to engage in 
micro-level, informal risk management strategies which frequently impose very high costs. 
Public interventions by the governments act on risk management systems that already exist, 
and the objective of such interventions should therefore be to support functional behaviour 
and institutions and weaken dysfunctional behaviour and opportunities
xiv (Shepherd, 2004; 
Conway and Norton, 2002). In other words, the function of public risk management strategy 
would be “to combine the best of private strategies with various public transfer programmes” 
(Webb, 2003a, p.16). Therefore, effective policymaking requires a nuanced understanding 
about the poor’s temporal decision framework and the way they allocate resources over time, 
so  that  transfers  can  crowd-in  sustainable  benefits  to  their  livelihoods.  This  crucial 
quantitative and qualitative information is provided by sophisticated diagnostic products such 
as  WFP’s  Vulnerability  Analysis  and  Mapping  or  World  Bank’s  Risk  and  Vulnerability 
Assessments. These tools can in fact revel very much on households’ sources of risk, the 
ability to manage them and the social relations that shape poverty patterns. 
While these important features are present in almost all the empirical work on social 
protection, there are differences in the interpretation of social protection across institutions 
reflecting  in  large  measure  their  particular  backgrounds,  specific  priorities  as  well  as 
theoretical and operational approaches
xv (GTZ, 2004; ILO, 2004; WFP, 2004a; Conway and 
Norton, 2002; ADB, 2001; Norton et al., 2001; World Bank, 2001a). In particular, the World 
Bank’s Social Risk Management (SRM) framework has been at the center of some analytical 
disputes. Certainly, the SRM framework has many  merits, not last it enriched the social 
protection  discourse  with  concepts  such  as  uncertainty,  asymmetric  information  and 
uninsured risks. In other words, it “drawn together and systematized a large body of pre-e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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existing work on vulnerability and risk with more recent thinking on the relationship, at the 
macro level, between risk management and the prospects for growth and poverty reduction” 
(Conway and Norton, 2002, p.534). It has also significantly contributed to pay more attention 
to the multiple social protection providers
xvi and to expand thinking from ex-post to ex-ante 
measures. With the words of the World Bank (2003a, p.15) “social protection and the way it 
is conceived underwent significant changes: from an afterthought to economic and human 
development it has moved to its center and is likely to stay there”. However, criticism to this 
framework exists. For instance, the SRM’s concentration on just income poverty is one of its 
most cited conceptual fallacies (MacKinnon, 2002). Devereux and Sabetes-Wheeler (2004) 
also argued that the SRM reflects a limited conceptualization of vulnerability
xvii, does not 
explicitly address the chronic poverty
xviii, concerns itself predominantly with formal social 
protection  strategies,  and  encourages  a  limited  role  for  government  in  social  protection 
provision. In addition, it seems that the SRM implicitly considers the chronically poor as 
non-vulnerable,  as  opposed  to  the  vulnerable-transitory  poor  who  may  seen  as  more 
economically active potential contributors to the growth process (see previous paragraph). 
Farrington (2005) noted that the World Bank presents its SRM framework largely as a “win-
win” scenario in which social protection protects people against sliding into poverty, and at 
the same time allows increased entrepreneurial risk-taking by providing social protection: 
“many  of  these  [SRM]  interventions  are  conceived  as  a  “trampoline”  to  allow  those 
producers who face temporary setbacks to “bounce back” into the productive economy. There 
are very few efforts to bring those largely outside the productive economy into it – along 
something of a trajectory from situations in which they mainly rely on social protection, to 
one  in  which  they  benefit  more  from  livelihood  promotion”.  Moreover,  building  on  the 
mounting  evidence  gathered  in  recent  years,  guidance  and  analysis  on  comparative 
advantages of food and cash transfers could be further developed, given its importance for 
designing a more fluid shift between social protection components
xix (Barrett and Maxwell, 
2005; Del Ninno et al. 2005; Harvey, 2005; Harvey et al. 2005; Hoddinott et al. 2004; Oxfam, 
2004; Devereux, 2002b; Rogers and Coates, 2002; Tabor, 2002). 
Social  protection  arrangements  could  facilitate  and  promote  the  socio-economic  and 
political inclusion of marginalized groups. As noted by Shepherd (2004), social protection 
needs to include measures “… that increase the chances that individuals and households will 
be in a position to contribute positively in future, otherwise its proponents could be accused 
of perpetuating poverty on a massive scale” (p.9). The author also highlighted that SRM’s 
presumption that prevention, mitigation and coping strategies are enough to automatically 
recover from shocks is empirically not well grounded, as a “risk of non recovery” has been 
documented and needs to be taken into account (Christopolos et al., 2004; Bird and Shepherd, 
2003).  
From a static point, social protection frameworks in developing countries
xx are based on 
three basic pillars: social prevention, social insurance and social assistance. Social prevention 
policies comprise the set of instruments aimed at both preventing risks from occurring and 
creating  the  legal  environment  for  social  and  economic  development.  Social  insurance 
options  include  two  main  classes,  namely  ‘truly’  insurance  mechanisms  (i.e.  paying  a 
premium and getting a payout when a predefined event occurs), and portfolio diversification 
opportunities. The  social assistance  pillar includes two  elements that are often  confused: 
safety nets and welfare mechanisms. While the safety nets are targeted to the chronically poor 
able to actively work, the welfare ones are aimed at better serving chronically poor people e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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who are nor able to do so (e.g. elderly or chronically sick), or maybe socially marginalized. 
Building on the work by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), “…other forms of ‘social 
protection’ would address distinct problems of ‘social vulnerability’, not necessarily through 
resource transfers, but through delivery of social services, and through measures to modify or 
regulate  behaviour  towards  socially  vulnerable  groups”  (p.9).  The  next  paragraph  will 
analyze more in depth safety nets’ static and dynamic effects and objectives.  
 
4. Mainstreaming Safety Nets into Social Protection 
During the past decade, there has been a widespread disillusionment with social safety nets 
which  were  criticized  as  costly  welfarist  mechanisms  that  reduced  the  poor  to  passive 
recipients  of  handouts  and  made  little  contribution  to  sustainable  poverty  reduction  and 
growth
xxi. Safety nets’ association with the “adjustment with a human face” approach doesn’t 
play a minor role in creating scepticism around this term (Devereux, 2003). People often 
perceive safety nets as ‘re-packaged old solutions’, as naïve approaches to poverty, or in 
extreme cases as a way of transferring western models into developing countries’ realities; 
even  the  term  itself  may  evoke  negative  images  –  poor  people  engaged  in  dangerous 
acrobatic exercises. This article takes into account all these relevant concerns, but also tries to 
not be sceptical ex ante, and attempts to throw light on the substance of the concept.   
Social safety nets have been particularly highlighted in the development agenda after the 
1990  World  Development  Report,  which  defined  social  safety  nets  as  “forms  of  income 
insurance to help people through short-term stress and calamities” (World Bank, 1990, p.90). 
During the following years there has been an increasingly tendency to use interchangeably 
the term ‘social safety nets’ with the broader concept of ‘social protection’. For example, 
Subbarao  et  al.  (1997)  defined  safety  nets  as  “programs  which  protect  a  person  and 
household against two adverse economic outcomes in welfare: chronic incapacity to work 
and  earn  (chronic  poverty)  and  a  decline  in  this  capacity  from  marginal  situation  that 
provides  minimal  means  for  survival  with  few  reserves  (transient  poverty)”  (p.2).  Also 
Haddad and Zeller (1996) assumed that “in the broadest sense of term, social safety nets are 
synonymous with social security which encompasses social insurance and social assistance 
functions”  (p.2).  From  a  static  point  of  view,  safety  nets  are  income  and  consumption 
transfers for the able-bodied chronic poor who cannot positively cope with shocks caused by 
uninsured risks
xxii. However, safety nets should be already available before shocks occur – 
they should be designed during good times. This is particularly important for the discussion 
in the next paragraph on the need for more predictable safety nets and the related potential 
developmental gains.  
In general, safety nets can be cash-based or food-based. While an extensive analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages between cash and food goes beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it’s worth to acknowledge that while the debate has focused very much on the ‘food vs. 
cash’  debate,  guidance  on  the  right  balance  between  the  two  remained  empirically 
underdeveloped
xxiii. Table 1 offers a flavor of the comparative advantages of cash and food 
transfers. 
 e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
 
  142 
 
 
In a more dynamic perspective (over time), its difficult to find out safety nets that may not 
have second-round effects in terms of, for example, social insurance or welfare
xxiv. In fact, 
also  a  World  Bank  (2001a)  claimed  that  “…in  most  developing  countries  today,  risk 
management emphasizes interventions after a disaster strikes. (…) Safety nets put in place 
before adverse shocks hit can serve both risk mitigation and coping purposes”. The longer 
run offers a more comprehensive safety nets analysis in terms of degree, where safety nets 
range from welfare-oriented to more prevention-oriented transfers. This means that safety 
nets should be a way of providing support, rather than just a set of transfers.  
In dynamic terms, food-for-education programmes (including school feeding and take-
home rations) may be more prevention-oriented due to the relation between education and 
capabilities. An excellent example of mitigation-oriented safety nets is provided by food-for-
training programmes, particularly in Bangladesh
xxv. These programmes address the unique 
constraints faced by the ultrapoor, enable people to join opportunities otherwise inaccessible, 
offers pathways out of poverty and serves as a bridge between risk coping instruments (food 
aid) and risk mitigation opportunities (microcredit). Another example of mitigation-oriented 
safety nets is provided by cash-for-work programmes, in particular when aimed at building 
assets to mitigate the effect of covariate risks
xxvi. Examples of welfare-oriented safety nets 
may be the provisioning of fortified foods to poor lactating or pregnant mothers, or to food 
aid  transfers  to  orphanages  in  poor  communities.  Also  targeted  near-cash  transfers  (i.e. 
subsidies, stamps and vouchers) may represent an example of welfare-oriented safety nets. 
The literature documenting the multiple safety nets functions is rich (Coady et al., 2004; 
Morley and Coady, 2003; Subbarao, 2003; Alderman, 2002; Barrett, 2002; Devereux, 2002a; 
Rogers and Coates, 2002; Tabor, 2002; Castaneda, 2000; Subbarao et al. 1997; Grosh, 1994). 
For example, one of the most important and documented objectives that safety nets pursue 
is consumption smoothing. However, evidence shows that pursuing this objective has been 
documented to have an impact in contexts of high poverty mobility (Zimmermann and Carter, 
2003;  Baulch  and  Hoddinott,  2000;  Jalan  and  Ravallion,  2000;  Yaqub,  2000;  Sinha  and 
Lipton,  1999;  Morduch,  1995).  The  problem  then  is  whether  safety  nets  are  the  best 
instruments in situations of endemic, ‘structural’ and widespread poverty. In other words, the 
difference between different livelihoods profiles may not only be tiny in theory, but even 
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Also Barrientos and Shepherd (2003) argued that countries where chronic poverty is more of 
a  residual  phenomenon  are  probably  in  the  best  position  to  address  the  issue  through 
redistributive  policies.  On  the  other  hand,  countries  where  there  are  large  numbers  of 
chronically poor may have least resources and capacities to develop and implement relevant 
policy frameworks. In these contexts the chronically poor and food insecure are more likely 
to benefit from more naïve welfare-oriented programmes (e.g. universal subsidies or basic 
health services) which may seem as old-fashion but are de-facto much needed (Devereux, 
2003; Ravallion, 2003). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, many governments are 
facing the “Catch-22” of social protection – the greater the need for social protection, the 
lower the capacity of the state to provide it. Underpinning to this situation is that where risk 
management  instruments  are  most  needed  may  not  be  where  returns  to  investment  are 
highest
xxvii (Webb and Rogers, 2003; Bird et al. 2002; Ravallion and Wodon, 1997). Fiscal 
unaffordability, lack of information, structural asset deficit, low administrative capacity are 
all identified as binding constraints in very poor countries (Barrientos, 2005; Grosh, 2005; 
Smith  and  Subbarao,  2003).  These  two  tendencies  –  increasing  social  outlays  and  fiscal 
contraction – tend to happen in concert, limiting Government’s ability to expand programmes 
at critical times and making social protection programmes pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical, 
as they effectively need to be (Alderman and Haque, 2005).  
Nonetheless, complementarities with the productive sectors are possible, and experiences 
are emerging on how to make humanitarian programmes more developmental (USAID, 2003; 
CARE, 2003a; Haddad and Frankenberger, 2003; Carucci, 2002). Following Devereux (2003, 
p.9),  “[new  strategies]  require  a  more  holistic  view  of  social  protection  than  is  usually 
adopted,  and  implies  making  strong  linkages  with  ‘developmental’  policies  without 
neglecting  the  immediate  needs  of  the  vulnerable”.  Mounting  evidence  is  also  revealing 
strong linkages with growth (Farrington, 2005; Ravallion, 2003; Farrington and Gill, 2002). 
Social  protection’s  focus  on  both  ex-ante  measures  (its  developmental  part)  and  ex-post 
response (its humanitarian part) can potentially help to both addressing the causes of long 
term vulnerability and dealing with the “Catch-22” itself
xxviii.  
However, the reality of many shock-prone, chronically poor countries is that relief and 
development can and often do occur in the same spatial environment at the same time
xxix 
(TANGO,  2004a;  Macrae  and  Bradbury,  1998).  In  addition,  operational  difficulties  are 
exacerbated by what Bradbury (1998) calls ‘the creeping process of normalization’ of crises 
in Africa
xxx and by complex political situations (Ali et al. 2005). That’s why the relief-to-
development framework adopted in the 90s has not been effective - its sequential nature did 
not reflect the reality in the field and didn’t provide a clear way to proceed from emergency 
programs to development-based activities, and vice versa (Harmer and Macrae, 2004). The 
challenge  that  social  protection  has  to  face  in  shock-prone  settings  is  that  “…chronic 
vulnerable populations require interventions that are stable and multi-year. Right now many 
programs are either large scale emergencies, which don’t see productive results, or smaller 
scale development programs, which don’t reach significant scale” (TANGO, 2004, p.12). 
Institutionalizing  a  social  protection  system  provides  an  opportunity  to  transition  from 
haphazard responses to shocks to nationwide system for risk and non-risk management
xxxi. 
For  the  poorest,  the  transition  aims  to  move  away  from  ad  hoc,  unpredictable  relief  to 
national  safety  nets  that  deliver  timely,  multi-year,  guaranteed  and  predictable  transfers. 
Providing predictable and multi-year transfers may expand households’ temporal decision 
framework, and by leveraging on their perception of risk guaranteed transfers may encourage e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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to  undertake  higher return  activities  that  incur  in  some  risk  (Dercon  2004;  World  Bank, 
2001a,b).  
By mainstreaming safety nets into the social protection agenda benefits may be twofold. 
On  the  one  hand,  this  approach  may  result  in  a  more  developmental  and  cost-effective 
approach  to  relief.  For  example,  Owens  and  Hoddinott  (1999)  estimated  that  the 
redistribution of relief aid given to Zimbabwean households in 1995-96 as development aid 
in 1992-93 would have reduced the incidence of poverty by 6% and its’ severity by 9%: 
“…cuts in development budgets to fund relief operations are therefore likely to incur in an 
opportunity cost in terms of forgone poverty reduction”. With the words of Shepherd (2004), 
“partnerships between humanitarian organizations and parts of the state designed to take up 
the social protection mandate could ensure a degree of accountability to ordinary people, if 
the  process  is  designed  with  accountability  in  mind”  (p.13).  On  the  other  hand,  social 
protection interventions seem to better respond if organized as a cross-cutting theme and 
when spread across a range of policy sectors rather than as one-sector approach
xxxii (Grosh, 
2005). This is what Norton et al. (2000) meant when they affirmed that social protection “is 
more appropriately perceived as a perspective” (p.69). Farrington et al. (2003) explored this 
issue  with  the  lens  of  potential  synergies  between  agriculture  and  social  protection,  and 
argued that “there is substantial unexploited scope for introducing the perspectives of the one 
into the design and implementation of the other”. 
New promising experiences are emerging worldwide where predictable safety nets are 
often explicitly designed to promote graduation of households out of chronic poverty
xxxiii, 
while the graduation itself will be further maximized as safety nets are integrated into the 
national social protection schemes. Examples include the recent Ethiopian Productive Safety 
Net  Programme,  Afghanistan’s  Livelihoods  and  Social  Protection  Public  Investment 
Programme and Malawi’s Joint Integrated Safety Net Programme (World Bank, 2005, 2003b; 
GoM and DFID, 2002; TISA, 2002). While the overall direction looks promising, most of 
these strategies are at the very first stages of implementation, therefore caution is needed in 
making fast conclusions. 
 
5. Conclusions and a Ten-Pillar Research Agenda 
This paper argues that in principle social protection can generate synergies in the narrowly 
defined sense of making the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Importantly, a social 
protection platform could be the basis for a common analytical floor, actors are more likely to 
‘speak the same language’, development and relief programmes could be more supportive 
rather  than  competitive,  and  efforts  are  more  likely  to  not  be  duplicated.  From  this 
perspective,  new  experiences  are  emerging  worldwide.  However,  while  new  empirical 
research has greatly contributed in better shaping our understanding of poverty causes and 
dynamics, social protection has to face many challenges in the coming years, and a number of 
specific knowledge gaps still need to be fulfilled.  
In particular, this article highly recommends a holistic research agenda that better explores 
a number of areas and provides viable operational guidance on the ground. Further research 
can help meet this challenge by better exploring the following ten key thematic areas: (i) the 
sequencing  of  shocks,  better  identification  of  non-risk  factors  and  how  they  generate 
vulnerabilities (e.g. particular attention could be paid in developing an analytical alternative 
to the transitory/chronic poverty approach for shock-prone, structurally-poor settings); (ii) 
identifying  the  extent  to  which  social  protection  can  be  mainstreamed  across  different e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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ministries; (iii) piloting innovative approaches for identifying synergies between different 
social protection components, thus making the ‘system effect’ more cohesive; (iv) throwing 
light on the specific design of social protection strategies in countries at a different stage of 
development, and in different areas within a given country (i.e. marginalized, remote rural 
areas); (v) how to better enshrine programmatic aspects on unexpected shocks; (vi) how to 
smoothly integrate humanitarian efforts into national social protection strategies; (vii) links 
between social protection and rights-based approaches; (viii) identifying more predictable 
mechanisms for financing counter-cyclical safety nets and better institutionalizing them in 
donor structures; (ix) more investigation is need on whether there are ‘trajectories’ from 
destitution to engagement with the productive sectors and how social protection can better 
complement the productive spheres; finally (x) advocacy efforts are also needed to ensure 
that social protection is adequately covered in national poverty reduction strategies. 
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i World Bank (2003a). 
ii It is important to highlight that this paper deals with poverty because much of the empirical work has 
been undertaken in relation to this dimension, especially on the dynamics during time (Dercon, 2004; 
Skoufias  and  Quisumbing,  2003;  Chaudhuri  et  al.,  2002;  Sumarto  et  al.,  2000).  However,  food 
insecurity is a crucial dimension to be considered in poor countries. While recognizing that poverty 
and food insecurity are related but not identical, important lessons can still be drawn and applied to the 
food insecurity context.  
iii Risk management is one way of reducing vulnerability. Others are by changing class/caste relations 
or by increasing political empowerment, as showed by figure 1. The paragraph reviews such issues 
when analyzing the so-called ‘non-risk’ factors. 
iv Distinctions can be made between various types of shocks: ‘natural’ (e.g. flood) or ‘manmade’ (e.g. 
war); ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, where the former is based on the decision-maker perception about 
the probabilities of events and outcomes, while the latter is based on reliable data; ‘idiosyncratic’ or 
‘covariate’,  where idiosyncratic shocks are household-specific (e.g. the death  of the family  head), 
while the covariate are more widespread and affect communities or regions (e.g. drought); ‘single’ or 
‘repeated’ shocks, where the difference lies in the recurring nature, also referred to as the degree of 
autocorrelation between shocks following one another (e.g. drought followed by sickness); ‘temporary’ 
or  ‘permanent’  shocks,  depending  whether  or  not  they  perpetuate  across  seasons  or  years; 
‘catastrophic’ and ‘non-catastrophic’ events, where the former occur with low frequency/severe effects 
(e.g. disability), while the latter with high frequency/non-severe effects (e.g. transient illness); and 
finally, ‘predictable’ and ‘non predictable’ shocks, depending by the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
the risk. However, different types of shocks should not be analysed as compartmentalized strands, but 
in a holistic way. For example, recent evidence from rural Indonesia shows that a covariate shock of 
economic nature has caused idiosyncratic nutritional outcomes (Block et al. 2004). 
v  For  example,  extensive  multidisciplinary  research  reveals  that  conservative  or  even  inert 
entrepreneurship  that  traps  its  practitioners  into  low  risk/low  return  activities  is  not  necessarily 
evidence of their irrationality, incompetence or backwardness, but may well be a manifestation of a 
finely  balanced  survival  algorithm.  Analyzing  qualitative  data  from  Ethiopia,  India  and  Uganda, 
Mosley and Verschoor (2003, p.25-26) suggested that “…hit after hit after hit will lead to a depletion 
of the (physical, human and social) capital buffer and thereby to an increased probability of income 
poverty in any given year, and thereby to an increased probability of chronic poverty. Chronic poverty 
itself, through its reign of terror on health and strength, self-esteem and optimism, reinforces the risk 
avoidance  that  is  prescribed  at  any  rate  by  a  long-term  survival  strategy.  Avoidance  of  risky 
investment opportunities that offer an escape from poverty completes the circle”. 
vi Transitory poverty is defined as a temporary inability to meet basic needs or smooth consumption 
levels  due  to  periodical  and  cyclical  fluctuations  in  incomes  or  unexpected  temporary  shocks. 
Households that persistently face deprivations over a significant timeframe (conventionally 5 years) 
are considered chronically poor (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). Chronic poverty is strongly associated 
with  structural  disadvantages  that  are  difficult  to  quickly  reverse,  typified  by  lack  of  assets,  high e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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dependency ratios, residence in remote locations, working in low-return occupational categories and 
chronic sickness and/or social barriers (CPRC, 2004; Bird et al., 2002; McKay and Lawson, 2002). 
Some of the chronic poor may remain in such conditions for most of their lifetime and may transmit 
income and related deprivations to next generation (Moore, 2001). 
vii These situations often happen outside the circuits of the highly-visible emergencies. That’s why they 
are also called ‘daily silent emergencies’ (Webb, 2003b). 
viii Diversification patterns reflect individual’s  voluntary exchange  of assets and their allocation  of 
assets across various activities with different risk profiles so as to achieve an optimal balance between 
expected returns and risk exposure (Dercon, 2004; Barrett et al., 2001; Block and Webb, 2001). Thus, 
in theory, the situation faced by rural households can be linked to that of an investor considering a 
range  of  opportunities  and  aiming  at  building  up  a  portfolio  of  assets,  and  “…rural  families 
increasingly come to resemble miniature highly diversified conglomerates” (Toulmin et al, 2000, p.10). 
But why do the poor diversify? We can distinguish between “push” and “pull” factors. The former 
concerns the limited risk bearing capacity in presence of rural market failures, and this create the 
incentive to select a portfolio of activities in order to stabilize income and consumption. In other words, 
livelihood diversification is a strategy for reducing risk and a response to diminishing factors returns. 
The  “pull”  factors  comprise  a  strategic  integrations  and  complementarities  between  activities  (i.e. 
crop-livestock production  integration), and specialization  according  to comparative advantages.(i.e. 
proximity  to  urban  areas  creates  potentialities  for  production-expenditure  linkage  activities).  The 
themes of diversification and its multiplier effects are also present in the food policy literature, and 
recent work on the rapid rise of supermarkets in developing countries is a point in case (Maxwell and 
Slater, 2003; Reardon et al., 2003). 
ix Interestingly,  this  debate  seems  to  follow  the  causal  distinction  between  ‘individualists’  and 
‘structuralists’ schools of thought made by Humphreys in his historical review in 1997. 
x For example, social security is often associated with public transfers provided by advanced public 
systems in developed countries. However, Shepherd (2004) developed a definition for social security 
in developing countries, namely as a specific subset of social protection programmes, namely the one 
formally  provided.  This  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that  informal  social  protection  in  developing 
countries is extremely important.   
xi However, this does not mean that in certain circumstances ‘pure’ transfers without any reciprocity 
are inappropriate (e.g. the welfare component of table 1, presented later in the paragraph). Moving 
from narrower social assistance programmes to broader social protection strategies doesn’t deny the 
importance  of  social  assistance  per  se,  but  does  emphasize  the  need  for  expanding  the  policy 
perspective (and consequent operational linkages). 
xii Intuitively,  the  level  of  complexity  for  designing  and  implementing  effective  risk  management 
programmes drastically increases in chronically food insecure environments. 
xiii For example, a very interesting workshop was organized by the Overseas Development Institute 
with the aim of laying out the broad conceptual and strategic issues involved in the definition of social 
protection strategies taken by donors (Norton et al., 2000). The major outcomes were some of the key-
issues in current thinking about social protection issues, namely that: (a) a broad range of potential 
actors and partnerships needs to be explored, and it’s essential that international agencies collaborate; 
(b) it is crucial that a social protection perspective is developed in a way that facilitate and stimulate a 
productive  dialogue  with  the  government  for  help  guide  choices,  prioritizing  and  sequencing 
interventions, better clarifying and mapping the capacities of different actors with regard to different 
social  protection  tasks,  and  enabling  national  ownership  of  the  programmes;  and  (c)  the 
institutionalization of social protection in donor structures is strongly needed. 
xiv It is often argued that public action should obviously not ‘crowding out’ informal risk management 
mechanisms, which however – in certain and well defined circumstances – may seem a contradiction 
when  the  objective  is  to  stimulate  a  behavioural  change  (e.g.  lessening  risk  aversion).  Following 
Conway and Norton (2002, p.537), “… the rationale for state action to reduce households’ exposure to e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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risk and to help ameliorate the effects of shocks which do occur is at least partly to provide, through 
more  efficient  and  equitable  collective  arrangements,  a  less  onerous  means  of  protection  against 
vulnerability. (…) Furthermore, state action may also include ‘crowd in’ other transfers”. 
xv For instance, how to base a social protection strategy – whether on needs, rights, or risks – is of 
serious concern, but in the actual scenario there is also room for optimism, as recently demonstrated by 
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004). Indeed, the authors showed that a combination of the three 
elements into social protection frameworks seems feasible. They advocate for a ‘transformative’ role 
for social protection – “where ‘transformative’ refers to the need to pursue policies that relate to power 
imbalances in society that encourage, create and sustain vulnerabilities” (p.9), so that the role of social 
protection is extended “to arenas such as equity, empowerment and economic, social and cultural 
rights  rather  than  confining  the  scope  of  social  protection  to  targeted  income  and  consumption 
transfers” (p.3). 
xvi Further refinements distinguish between formal (public or market-based) and informal (individual 
or  group-based)  social  protection  providers.  The  latter  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  developing 
countries. 
xvii Interestingly, the authors argued that “…if rather than focusing on risk as an exogenously given 
factor to be managed, vulnerability is conceptualized as emerging from and embedded in the socio-
political context, then our attention would no longer be focused on how to design a policy so that 
various groups face less risk in a given context, but on how to change this context to minimize risk for 
a range of vulnerable groups”. 
xviii Also Conway and Norton (2002) noted that “… the World Bank approach to social protection can 
be seen to focus mainly on social insurance, and to leave somewhat underdeveloped the discussion of 
social assistance” (p.535). 
xix The analysis of cash and food transfers has been a recurrent theme in the humanitarian agenda. 
Recent research patterns are going toward a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of food aid’s 
impact;  at  the  same  time  new  experiences  are  accumulating  on  innovative  cash  pilots,  both  in 
emergencies and non-emergency settings. Assuming the hypothetical case that both cash and food are 
available  for  a  programme,  deciding  whether  to  use  one  or  the  other  is  not  an  easy  task.  Recent 
evidence  suggest that  when  markets are  not integrated, reliable infrastructure are  not be in  place, 
administrative capacity is weak, food availability is insufficient, effective demand for food is lacking 
and malnutrition is at high levels, then it may be the case to have a food-based programme, turning to a 
cash-based when conditions are appropriate to enable such switch. In fact, if it is the case that markets 
can be made to function more effectively – by improving information flows, reducing transport costs, 
improving contract design and enforcement mechanisms, making entry easier into food markets and 
distribution – then over time, the need for direct food transfers in particular should fall. While many of 
the comparative advantages of cash and food transfers are now generally known, less attention has 
been paid on how to better combine these two options, and how to better design a smooth sequencing 
of interventions. Given the different vulnerability profile of people and areas in developing countries 
and the need to provide a diversified to response according to different risks and needs, I would argue 
that in given circumstances cash might be a better option, food might comparative advantages in others, 
and that moreover they can be harmoniously and simultaneously implemented as part of countries’ 
social protection system. 
xx Of course, the ‘developing countries’ group is not homogeneous. As WFP (2004a) and Shepherd 
(2004) rightly pointed out, different social protection frameworks are present in different countries 
accordingly to their stage of development. 
xxi However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, transfers for those who cannot engage fully in 
productive activities have to taken in due account. 
xxii The emphasis on the ‘uninsured’ risk is important. It underpins not only that chronic poor people 
may not have the capacity to insure against many types of risks, but also that this definition is for 
safety nets during ‘normal’ times. Indeed, when unpredictable covariate shocks hit large portions of a e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                     Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 133-157 
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population, safety nets should be flexible enough to temporarily expand to reach those (e.g. transitory 
poor) who may have insured against risks, but who now have lost everything and are desperately in 
need. 
xxiii Building on what was argued in the note number 19, it is important to bear in mind the crucial role 
played by adequate non-food resources for complementing food-assisted programmes and ensuring 
that delivery can be guaranteed to the most remote areas (Webb, 2003a). 
xxiv This also confirms the overlapping nature between Guhan’s social protection measures. 
xxv An example is the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD) programme, 
jointly run by WFP, national NGOs and the Bangladeshi Government. Using food provisioning as a 
leverage, training in savings and microcredit is offered to ultrapoor women, thus diminishing their 
opportunity costs to participate and overcoming the barriers to entry in micro-enterprises initiatives. 
Considerable impact and success is reported from several studies (Matin and Hulme, 2003; Hashemi, 
2001; RESAL, 2000; WFP, 1997). However, there is still scope for improvement in the programme 
design (Webb et al., 2002). 
xxvi Public works in general – at the community level or not, with a wage paid in cash or in-kind 
(food) – can pursue a wide range of objectives. If the asset to be constructed is a road that can better 
connect markets, than public works may have Guhan’s promotional effects. When for instance they are 
aimed  at  achieving  positive  environmental  outcomes,  then  they  may  be  more  prevention-oriented 
safety nets (see for example WFP’s MERET project in Ethiopia). 
xxvii An interesting body of literature is now showing that competitive rates of return in terms of both 
growth and poverty reduction can be offered by relatively less-favoured areas, where however a certain 
degree of structural investments was already in place - e.g. India and China (Fan and Hazell, 1999). 
xxviii The fact that these measures are accessible in different moments (ex ante and ex post) should not 
be confused with the fact that both of them should be put in place before a crisis hit. As already 
mentioned, safety nets should be designed in ‘good times’. 
xxix Risk management is an integrating concept that incorporates both emergency response as well as 
measures  for  overcoming  chronic  vulnerability.  This  is  basically  the  idea  underlying  the 
‘Development-Relief’ approach for food aid programmes – i.e. that emergency and non-emergency 
interventions can be implemented harmoniously, and even simultaneously (TANGO, 2004a,b,c).  
xxx Bradbury argued that in countries such as Sudan and Somalia, levels of malnutrition that would 
once have triggered a crisis response come to be accepted as normal, to be dealt with in development 
terms. 
xxxi Following De Haan (2000, p.2), “adopting social protection as an organizing framework “helps to 
re-focus  social  protection  policies,  moving  beyond  a  residualist  welfare  agenda  dealing  with  the 
negative social consequences of economic changes and transitions, towards holistic approaches that 
inform the wide range of policies that affect the well-being of the poor”. 
xxxii A national safety net programme is the long-term objective. In the short-term, resources may be 
channelled  through  a  number  of  implementing  partners  because  of  national  capacity  and  donor 
constraints. 
xxxiii These  strategies  also  recognise  that  a  number  of  chronic  poor  people  will  not  graduate  (e.g. 
disabled) and for them a welfare-oriented safety net is better suited in addressing their constraints. 